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to such seeming injustices, and to inform courts of their actual intent,
parties associating themselves for the purpose of obtaining government con-
tracts should be careful to characterize their undertaking in writing and to
further stipulate their rights and duties. Care should be taken that their
agreement cannot be construed as contravening the spirit or the letter of
federal procurement law. In the event the parties enter into some form of
joint undertaking, they should expressly determine, as definitely as possible,
the subject matter of their agreement, how long their association will last,
and at what point their association will cease. Even after the undertakings
have been spelled out, a party should take care to acquire sufficient docu-
mentation to prove that he (usually the prime contractor) is justified in
terminating some aspect of the association and embarking upon a course of
action inconsistent with the prior, and now terminated, relationship.
This long and expensive litigation could have been avoided had GE and
AT more definitely specified the character and terms of their relationship.
Since this was not done, the court was called upon to construe the parties'
undertakings from their actions. The court could have clarified developing
"joint venture" law by more thoroughly examining the parties' conduct under
present law governing such associations, rather than elaborating its theory
of "joint undertaking."
JOHN F. O'LEARY
Interstate and Foreign Commerce—Power of the States to Regulate
Traffic in Intoxicating Liquor.—Defrartment of Revenue v. James B.
Beam Distillery; 1
 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. 2—
The United States Supreme Court recently handed down two decisions de-
fining the right of the states, under the twenty-first amendment, to regulate
commerce in intoxicating liquors within their boundaries. The amendment
provides in its second section: "The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 3
Although both cases deal with a reduction of state powers under the amend-
ment, they involve interpretation of two separate constitutional provisions in
relation to the amendment. Beam involves the effect of the amendment on the.
import-export clause, 4 while Hostetter concerns the impact of the amendment
1 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
2 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
3 U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2.
4 U.S. Const. art. I, 10, d. 2:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any
State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control
of Congress.
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on the commerce clause.° For this reason, the cases will be considered
separately.
In the Beam case, the state of Kentucky imposed, by statute,° a tax
of ten cents per proof gallon on Scotch whisky which the plaintiff imported
from Scotland for purposes of resale. On the date of assessment, the liquor
was in its original packages in the hands of the importer, not yet consigned
for sale. The plaintiff paid the tax under protest and then brought an action
for refund of the money thus paid. The Kentucky Circuit Court affirmed a
state tax commission order dismissing the claim, and on appeal, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court decision.? The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. HELD: The payment required is a tax on
imports, prohibited to the states by the import-export clause of the United
States Constitution, the effect of which remains unaltered by passage of the
twenty-first amendment. States may prohibit or regulate foreign liquor coming
within their borders, but may not levy an import tax on it.
In reaching its decision, the Court places primary emphasis on the effect
of the twenty-first amendment on the import-export clause, commenting that
"to sustain the tax . . .would require nothing short of squarely holding that
the Twenty-first Amendment has completely repealed the Export-Import
Clause so far as intoxicants are concerned."8 The Court expressly rejects a
contention to this effect and goes on to distinguish the cases cited by the
defendant-appellant on grounds that none deal with the import-export clause .°
The majority finds that because of its absolute terms, the import-export
clause has not been modified by the twenty-first amendment. Since the liquor
here involved was still an import under the "Original Package Doctrine,"10
and since the tax levied contravened the "explicit and precise words of the
Export-Import Clause,'" 11 the money paid must be refunded to the plaintiff.
The Court takes pains to point out that this decision does not prevent Ken-
tucky from prohibiting or otherwise regulating the flow of foreign liquor
into its territory, as long as that regulation does not take the form of an
import tax.
In examining the history behind the Court's theory in the principal case,
5 U.S. Const. art. I, fl 8, cl. 3:
The Congress shall have the power ....
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.
8 Ky. Rev. Stats. 243.680(2)(a):
No person shall ship or transport or cause to be shipped or transported into
the state any distilled spirits from points without the state without first obtain-
ing a permit from the department and paying a tax of ten cents on each proof
gallon contained in the shipment.
7 367 S.W.2d 267 (Ky. 1963).
8 Supra note 1, at 345.
9 Gordon v. Texas, 355 U.S. 369 (1958), affirming 166 Tex. Crim. 24, 310 S.W.2d
328 (1956) ; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939) ; Indianapolis Brewing Co.
v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939); State Board of Equalization v. Young's
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
19 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945) ; Low v. Austin, 80 U.S.(13 Wall.) 29 (1871); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
11 Supra note 1, at 346.
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there is scarcely any direct authority on the relation of the twenty-first
amendment to the import-export clause. An examination, however, of the
development of powers in the state under the amendment in connection with
other clauses of the Constitution, notably the commerce clause, sheds valuable
light on the status of state power at the time of this decision.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the question of states' rights to
regulate liquor traffic was never decided firmly, Although Chief Justice
Taney, in the License Cases,' 2
 extended wide powers to the states in this
area, the subsequent cases of Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry." and
Leisy v. Hardin14
 restricted them severely. In answer to the latter decisions,
Congress passed the Wilson Act" and the Webb-Kenyon Act" which gave
the states authority to regulate the flow of liquor in their territories to a
much greater degree than was permissible in the case of other commodities.
In interpreting these statutes, the Supreme Court in numerous cases indicated
that the commerce clause had been relaxed with regard to liquor, and the
states were allowed to exercise wide prohibitory and regulatory powers."
It was due to uncertainty as to the validity of these statutes that the second
section of the twenty-first amendment was passed. This raised the terms
of these acts to constitutional dignity. 18
During the first years following passage of the amendment, the Court
rendered several decisions which have prevailed to this day, but which demon-
strably fail to accord with the spirit of the decision in the instant case.'°
12 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
13
 125 U.S. 465
14 135 U.S. 100
15 26 Stat. 313
(1888).
(1890).
(1890), 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1958):
All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into
any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage
therein, shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation
and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its
police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids
or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be
exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or
otherwise.
13 49 Stat. 877 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1958):
The shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of
any spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating liquor of any
kind from one State, Territory, or District of the United States, or place non-
contiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, into any other State,
Territory, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, . . . which said . . . liquor is intended, by
any person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner
used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of
such State, Territory, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to
but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is prohibited.
17 United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420 (1919); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. North
Carolina, 245 U.S. 298 (1917); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311
(1917).
18 Dugan v. Bridges, 16 F. Supp. 694 (D.C.N.H. 1936), appeal dismissed, 300 U.S.
684 (1936).
19 Gordon v. Texas, supra note 9; Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, supra note 9;
Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, supra note 9; State Board of
Equalization v. Young's Market Co., supra note 9.
t
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The leading case for the older interpretation of the amendment is State Board
of Equalization v. Young's Market.2° In that case the state of California
levied an import tax on beer imported by the plaintiff from Missouri and
Wisconsin. The plaintiff contended that such a tax violated its rights under
the commerce and equal protection clauses. The Supreme Court rejected this
view, announcing, with respect to the commerce clause, that "the amendment
which 'prohibited' the 'transportation or importation' of intoxicating liquors
into any state 'in violation of the laws thereof' abrogated the right to import
free, so far as concerns intoxicating liquors." 2 ' The Court stated its position
on the equal protection clause equally succinctly when it said: "A classifi-
cation recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed for-
bidden by the Fourteenth."22 By this statement the Court acknowledged that
the state's action was discriminatory and would be prohibited as violative
of the equal protection clause, except for the fact that the twenty-first amend-
ment allows state action even of a discriminatory nature. This is the theory
of "plenary power" which this case, and those following it, extended to
the states.23
General language in these cases Ied some observers to foresee the possi-
bility that the Supreme Court would hold that the amendment softens the
import-export clause, as well as the commerce and equal protection clauses,
and would allow the individual states to impose an import tax on liquor from
other nations. 24 Indeed, in his dissenting opinion in Beam, Justice Black
argues strongly that the twenty-first amendment should be construed so as
to give the states as much authority over foreign imports as they have previ-
ously been granted over domestic imports. He states, "I cannot take it upon
myself to say that a State can tax liquors made in this country but not those
made in Scotland—a distinction not suggested by the Amendment's language
or its history." 25
It should be noted, however, that in failing to follow the pattern of the
earlier cases the Court was not charting a completely new course. In the
first place, even those decisions which had granted plenary power to the
states under the amendment spoke of certain undefined authority reserved
in the federal government. 26 For example, in Young's Market,27 the Court
said, in commenting on the argument that the amendment freed the states
from all constitutional checks on their police power with respect to liquor,
that "the question for decision requires no such generalization." 25 The
majority could also refer to those state courts which had adjudicated this
issue and point to decisions prohibiting a tax by any name on imported liquor
20 State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., supra note 9.
21 Id. at 62.
22 Id. at 64.
23 Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, supra note 9; Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor
Control Comm'n, supra note 9.
24
 See 14 Stan. L. Rev. 876, 882 (1962), 55 Yale L.J. 815, 816 (1946).
25 Supra note I, at 348.
26 Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) ; State Board of Equaliza-
tion v. Young's Market Co., supra note 9.
27 State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., supra note 9.
28 id. at 64.
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on the grounds that such a levy is an import tax and is not within the juris-
diction of the state." In deciding a case with a fact situation similar to
Beam, the California District Court of Appeals said:
Foreign imported intoxicating liquor, while still in the hands of the
importer and in its original packages, is an import which, under the
import-export clause, has been made immune to state taxation. In
other words, the Twenty-first Amendment did not repeal the im-
port-export clause insofar as intoxicating liquors are concerned 8 0
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently adopted the same position in the
case of State ex rel. H. A. Morton Co. v. Board of Review. 81
The effect of the Beam decision is to allow the states a wide latitude in
the exercise of their police power to prohibit or regulate a harmful traffic
in liquor, but to recognize as well a limit beyond which the state police
power may not validly be extended. The line is carefully drawn at the level
of state interference with the exclusively federal right to levy import duties.
This result is reasonable because the position of the federal government
as the supreme authority in dealings between the United States and foreign
governments must be held superior to the asserted rights of the individual
states to regulate imported intoxicating liquors by taxation. From the earliest
days of our national existence it has been held that "all the powers which
relate to our foreign intercourse are confided to the general government.""
Clearly, state laws and policies must not hamper the federal government in
its conduct of international affairs. It will be conceded that one of the most
essential aspects of international commercial dealings is the power to form
agreements setting the level of import duties." To insure that this power
would remain firmly in the hands of the federal government, the import-
export clause was included in the Constitution.'" Only a constitutional amend-
ment expressed in the most specific language should be construed to give
the power to the individual states to subordinate the authority of the federal
government in this field by interposition of their own laws over foreign
commerce.
The framers intended the twenty-first amendment for a specific purpose
—to allow the states to protect their citizens against any abuses which might
arise from their citizens' use of liquor. It was to be a "saving clause to avoid
conflict with those states which at the time had their own state prohibition
laws or might thereafter adopt prohibition as a matter of state policy." 8°
29 State ex rel. H. A. Morton Co. v. Board of Review, 15 Wis. 2d 330, 112 N.W.2d
914 (1962); Parrott & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 131 Cal. App. 2d 332,
280 P.2d 881 (1955).
80 Parrot & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, supra note 29, at 336, 280
P.2d at 883.
81 State ex rel. H. A. Morton Co. v. Board of Review, supra note 29.
82 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570 (1840).
88 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ; Board of Trustees v. United
States, 289 U.S. 48, 56 (1933).
84 Brown v. Maryland, supra note 10, at 439.
88 United States v. Colorado Wholesale Wine & Liquor Dealers' Ass'n, 47 F. Supp.
160, 162 (D. Colo. 1942), aff'd, 324 U.S. 293 (1944). See 76 Cong. Rec. 4170-71 (1933)
(remarks of Senator Borah).
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The intent of the framers is persuasive in the case of the twenty-first amend-
ment because of the relatively short time and insignificant change in the
social life of the country since its passage.
Looking to the future, the Court has decided that the import-export
clause must remain entirely intact, leaving the full complement of power in
the states to regulate importation of liquor. This leaves no room for any
trend of either encroachment on the federal government's powers or expan-
sion of them at the states' expense. The line drawn by the Court will in all
probability remain static.
Another indication of the Court's new and stricter interpretation of the
twenty-first amendment is found in the second principal case, Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp." The plaintiff in this case bought liquor
from wholesalers in other states and brought it into New York. It was then
sold tax-free at retail to outgoing international travellers. When a traveller
purchased liquor from the plaintiff, he paid for it and received a receipt.
No liquor was delivered to him in this country, but it was put aboard his
flight and delivered to him at his foreign destination. The defendants, as
chairman and members of the New York State Liquor Authority, ordered
the plaintiff to cease doing business, since it was unlicensed and unlicensable
under New York law. This opinion was based on the lack of provision for a
business such as that of the plaintiff in the New York Alcoholic Beverage
Control Law." The plaintiff brought an action to enjoin the defendants from
interfering with its conduct of business. The district court, sitting as a three-
judge panel, granted the injunction." The United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction and granted certiorari. HELD: The twenty-first
amendment does not supersede the commerce clause to the extent of allowing
a state to prohibit traffic in intoxicating liquor across its territory when there
is no use or distribution of the liquor within that state.
In its opinion, the Court first considers the relationship between the
disputed sections of the Constitution and comments that it has remained
unquestioned that the amendment abrogates the commerce clause with
regard to liquor "destined for use, distribution, or consumption within its
borders."" But to conclude from this that the twenty-first amendment has
completely repealed the effect of the commerce clause on the federal govern-
ment's control over intoxicants would be an "absurd oversimplification.""
The Court cites a series of cases for the proposition that the state may
properly regulate, but may not prohibit, the traffic in liquor across its terri-
tory with an ultimate destination in another jurisdiction. 41 Concluding that
New York's conduct in the instant case does not amount to approved regu-
lation but rather to a complete prohibition of liquor which is not being
30 Supra note 2.
87 N.Y. Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, §§ 3(28), 100(1), 105(2) (1955).
88 Idlewild Bon-Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 212 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.V. 1962).
80 Supra note 2, at 330.
40 Supra note 2, at 332.
41. Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944); Carter v. Virginia,
321 U.S. 131 (1944); Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938),
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diverted into the state for use therein, the Court declares the defendants'
conduct to be repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution.
An examination of the precedent cited by the Court in Hostetter shows
clearly that this case is not easily reconciled with previous Supreme Court
decisions determining the relationship between the commerce clause and the
twenty-first amendment. It is a familiar rule that, while a state may take
reasonable precautions to guard against the violation of its laws by one who
is transporting liquor through its territory to another jurisdiction, it may not
prohibit the traffic altogether. Application of that rule to the facts of this
case is surprising, however, since all of the cases cited by the Court as
precedent are distinguishable on the facts. In Collins v. Yosemite Park and
Curry Co.," the transportation in question was across the state of California
to a national park, sovereignty over which the state had ceded to the federal
government. In Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 43
 the intoxicants involved
were being moved through Oklahonia to Fort Sill, a military reservation
under federal jurisdiction. The Court also cites with approval a New York
case, During v. Valente," which held that businesses located in the Free
Trade Zone of the Port of New York are not governed by New York law. In
the principal case, however, passage of title to the purchaser and consignment
of the goods for delivery to the owner occurred in "New York territory
subject to New York, not federal jurisdiction.""
The holding in this case is also a surprising departure from precedent
in that the sale of liquor within a state's boundaries, regardless of subsequent
consumption, has always been considered to be one type of transaction pe-
culiarly within the states' control under the amendment." In the cases cited
by the Court and discussed above, there was no such transaction involved
within the jurisdiction of the state. 47 In Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves" the Court
said: "Without a doubt a state may absolutely prohibit the manufacture of
intoxicants, [and] their ... sale . . . irrespective of the use to which they
are to be put."" Subsequently, Justice Frankfurter stated the rule with which
he was familiar in a concurring opinion in Carter v. Virginia: 54 "In other
words, liquor need not be intended for consumption in a State to be deemed
to be imported into the State and therefore subject to control by that State." 5 '
The result of this decision is to alter the extent of state regulatory power
to control the use, distribution, or consumption of liquor in that state. The
state may now regulate distribution only if there is concurrent use or con-
sumption in its territory. The federal government is guaranteed the right,
under the commerce clause, to be supreme in governing traffic in liquor not
intended for actual consumption by persons in the state.
42 Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., supra note 41.
43
 Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., supra note 41.
44 267 App. Div. 383, 46 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1944).
45 Supra note 2, at 335.
45 Carter v. Virginia, supra note 41; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
47 Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., supra note 41; Collins v. Yosemite Park &
Curry Co., supra note 41; During v. Valente, supra note 44.
48 Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, supra note 46.
49 Id. at 138.
60 Carter v. Virginia, supra note 41.
51 Id. at 141.
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This result is consonant with the purposes of the twenty-first amend-
ment of allowing each state to protect its citizens from what its legislature
may consider to be the evils of drinking intoxicating liquor.52
 The amendment
should not be interpreted to give domestic producers a competitive advantage
over out-of-state rivals. The interest protected is not the economy, but rather
the health, welfare, and morals of the people, which could be impaired by
the unrestricted use of intoxicating liquor." The Hostetter majority feels
that it can be no concern of the state if a sales transaction, unaccompanied
by any use of liquor, takes place within its jurisdiction. Authority to govern
such a transaction would be more power than the state requires to protect
its citizens, and more than the twenty-first amendment was intended to give.
Here again, as in Beam, we see a withdrawal of a measure of the plenary
power granted to the states by the decisions handed down soon after the
amendment's ratification. For, at that time, the Court approved actions by
the states even though they were not intended for protection from con-
sumption of liquor. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court in Indianapolis
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n said: "Whether the Michigan law
should not more properly be described as a protective measure [for local
industry], we have no occasion to consider. For whatever its character, the
law is valid."" The Court restated this position in Finch & Co. v. McKittrick
in saying, again through Justice Brandeis, that a Missouri law would be valid
even if it "does not relate to the protection of the health, safety, and morality,
or the promotion of social welfare, but is merely an economic method of
retaliation."55 It is not the province of the police power to extend this far,
however, for this is a "power which is limited of its own inherent nature to
certain necessary objectives." 55 Certainly the ability to discriminate economi-
cally against sister states was not one of the "necessary objectives" of the
grant of power to the states under the twenty-first amendment. For these
reasons, it is submitted that this retreat from plenary power is correct, and
the decision effecting it is reasonable.
Looking to the future, it is likely that Hostetter will herald further re-
finements in the relation of the commerce clause to the twenty-first amend-
ment. It would be a logical step from this decision to a holding that an
import tax on domestic liquor passing in interstate commerce is unconstitu-
tional if its primary purpose is to raise revenue rather than to protect the
best interests of the residents of the state, or to a holding that laws passed
for economic retaliation are not within the purview of the powers granted
to the states by the twenty-first amendment. Today's Court would in all
probability decide cases similar on the facts to Young's Market, Finch & Co.,
and Indianapolis Brewing Co. differently; for, as we have suggested, the state
laws in those cases could not withstand the test of Hostetter.
Taken together the Beam and Hostetter cases result in a better balance
52 76 Cong. Rec. 4170-71 (1933) (remarks of Senator Borah).
53 Ibid.
54 Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, supra note 9, at 394.
55 Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, supra note 9, at 397-8.
56 The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation,
216 (Corwin ed. 1953).
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of power between the states and the federal government. The states retain
the power to protect their citizens from the evils of alcohol while the federal
government retains supremacy in international matters and control over the
essential aspects of interstate commerce.
DENNIS J. ROBERTS II
Labor Law—Collective Bargaining Agreements.—John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston.1—This action was brought by District 65, Retail, Whole-
sale, and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, against John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act? The
Union sought to compel Wiley to arbitrate under a collective bargaining
agreement between the Union and Interscience Publishing, Inc. Interscience
had merged with Wiley four months before the agreement was to have ex-
pired and no longer existed as a corporate entity. The agreement did not
expressly bind successors of Interscience. Wiley closed the Interscience plant
and moved the 80 employees of Interscience to its own plant where they were
mingled with the Wiley force of about 300. None of the latter were unionized.
The district court assumed that the agreement survived the merger and
that it bound Wiley, but denied the Union's petition on other grounds . 5 The
court of appeals reversed and directed arbitration, holding that the merger
did not ipso facto extinguish all rights of the Union and the employees arising
out of the collective bargaining agreement. 4 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 5 HELD: Wiley is compelled to arbitrate where (1) the merger did
not change the nature of the business entity, (2) the transfer of employees
was effected without difficulty, and (3) the Union made clear and maintained
its position before and after the merger.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the preference for arbitration under
the national labor policy is controlling. The shift from one corporate orga-
nization to another will in most cases be facilitated and industrial strife will
be avoided if employees' claims continue to be resolved by arbitration rather
than by tests of strength. This policy favoring arbitration would, in fact, be
thwarted if employers could circumvent the duty to arbitrate by altering
corporate structures. The Court concluded that these policy considerations
are not overcome by the fact that Wiley did not sign the agreement since
1 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
2 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 185(a) (1958).
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any Such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
8 Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
The application was denied because the Union had failed to follow the grievance procedure
established in the collective bargaining agreement.
4 Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963), noted 5 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 193 (1963).
5 373 U.S. 908 (1963).
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